



# COMMITMENT

*a framework for achieving better outcomes  
for youth committed delinquent*

Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance  
response to the Department of Children and Families Draft Plan for the  
Closure of the Connecticut Juvenile Training School  
September, 2016



## Executive Summary

Governor Dannel Malloy has committed to closing the Connecticut Juvenile Training School (CJTS) by July, 2018. We strongly support closure by that date or sooner. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) issued a draft plan for closure and asked for responses to its plan, hence this document. Our response combines data, research and expert opinion to offer ways to transform our overall approach to committed delinquent youth - allowing us to close CJTS, promote public safety, use tax dollars more effectively and improve outcomes for youth.

Any closure plan must look at all aspects of our committed delinquent policy-making, practices and decision points. It must include data-driven census projections and risk/needs assessments for all committed delinquent youth. Better information will make the closure process more efficient. DCF's plan considers keeping CJTS open because of the difficulty of finding alternative secure quarters for 40 to 50 youth. However, DCF did not offer data to support their assertion that the state needs 40-50 secure beds. Our position is that a thorough and data-driven analysis will find alternative, more effective ways to serve a portion of these youth and save the state from maintaining or creating expensive and unneeded secure capacity – thus making the 2018 deadline easier to achieve.

We recognize the need for some hardware secure beds in our continuum. But only youth who present a risk to public safety should be placed in locked facilities. This is national best practice and is consistent with state statute. Last year, the legislature removed the words “punish the child” from our juvenile justice system's mission. Research clearly documents that incarceration is not rehabilitative, especially for young people.<sup>1</sup> Unless a child presents a risk to public safety, incarceration is purely punitive and therefore contrary to the letter and spirit of our law. The system should of course continue to hold youth accountable, but in ways that promote rehabilitation rather than impose hardship for hardship's sake.

Currently, we have few options for committed delinquent youth outside of incarceration. It is as if we are riding a bike with a single gear: Maybe it's designed for going uphill, but it is inefficient on a flat stretch. We need to build a system that has options for every situation. We need more gears.

This document proposes a step-by-step process that can start immediately:

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<sup>1</sup> Pew Charitable Trusts. Reexamining Youth Incarceration: High cost, poor outcomes spark shift to alternatives. April 20, 2015.

- Take an in-depth look at the youth committed delinquent in the past 12-18 months, find out what they need and what led to their commitment.
- Create a structured decision-making tool, guided by the profile of youth the analysis provides, to understand the scope of interventions our system needs and to foster fair and appropriate placement and/or service matching.
  - This work will allow the state to:
    - Identify gaps
    - Determine how to fill those gaps
    - Collaborate with the non-profit community to determine its capacity to provide programming, including taking some responsibility for staff and hardware secure options.
    - Determine how many youth would still need secure beds if service gaps were filled
    - Decide the best option for locating the secure beds the system still needs
    - Embed a transparent process of continuous quality improvement to ensure that all programs throughout the continuum follow best practice, are therapeutic and serve youth safely, effectively and efficiently.

Each of these action steps should be attached to specific, measurable goals on an explicit timetable.

Given the low number of youth committed delinquent in Connecticut, the analysis we propose can be accomplished in a timely way, as part of a work plan that supports a closing in July, 2018 or sooner. In fact, the state should move immediately to do individualized case assessments for youth currently at CJTS. This will reveal:

- Opportunities to move youth to less restrictive settings
- Gaps in the system, as we identify youth who do not require incarceration, but must remain at CJTS because we currently lack viable placement or service alternatives

The process to transform our approach to committed delinquent youth requires a look at the Judicial Branch. Judges hold the power to commit youth delinquent. The data around this judicial decision point must also be examined to determine consistency across jurisdictions and understand what additional interventions judges would need in order to commit fewer youth.

The Juvenile Justice Policy and Oversight Committee (JJPOC) should assume responsibility for the systemic examination and transformation of our policies and practices surrounding committed delinquent youth. JJPOC's lead would recognize that responsibility for youth committed delinquent does not lie with DCF alone. Judges make the decision to commit youth delinquent. Also, as a legislatively-appointed body, the JJPOC can explore and advocate for appropriations needed to fulfill the Governor's mandate in ways an executive branch agency cannot.

To that point, we recognize that the state's fiscal crisis must be considered in developing a new system for committed delinquent youth. Alternatives to secure incarceration save taxpayers money, while giving them the benefit of safer neighborhoods. Reducing its use of incarceration will increase Connecticut's opportunity to claim federal reimbursements. We do, however, make clear that increasing options within the system comes with a short-term price tag. Some of the tens of millions of dollars Connecticut currently spends on CJTS must be redeployed to create a more comprehensive array of services for committed delinquent youth if we are going to achieve our shared goal of improved public safety and improved youth outcomes.

Finally, we address the reality that youth may continue to be held in CJTS for the nearly two years between now and July 2018. We suggest low- and no-cost strategies to make that facility safer and trauma-informed in the interim, drawing heavily upon a DCF-commissioned expert's report. The best way to keep the public and youth safe, of course, is to stop using facilities like CJTS. We suggest strategies to continue to lower census there while it is phased out of Connecticut's service continuum.

## Introduction

### **Why this report?**

Good outcomes spring from good planning. We support Governor Malloy's commitment to close the Connecticut Juvenile Training School (CJTS) by July, 2018 and wish to contribute to the planning process toward this worthy goal. The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance gathered relevant state data and reports, national studies and best practices to lay out a framework for planning services for committed delinquent youth. We also interviewed some of the leading juvenile justice experts in the United States to get their reactions to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) plan for CJTS closure. DCF conducted listening sessions across the state with Local Interagency Services Teams and other community members as it created its plan. We appreciate this work and do not seek to duplicate it, but rather to enhance it.

Note: we asked experts for *reaction*, not *rebuttal*. DCF's plan has many laudable components, as we will note throughout this report. Our goal is simply to provide decision makers with as much relevant information as possible.

Connecticut can make informed choices that:

- Guide more young people to success
- Lower crime in our communities
- Cost less than our current system
- Ensure fairness regardless of race, gender or sexual orientation

In order to make those informed choices, we must first ask the right questions:

### **What is the task?**

We must look at the whole continuum of services for youth who are committed delinquent. In 2015, 257 youth were committed delinquent, and 176 of those were admitted to CJTS or its Pueblo Unit. To be sure, this is a small percentage of the more than 10,000 youth referred to juvenile court each year. There is no debate that adjudicated delinquent youth present with challenging behaviors and complex needs. That said, it is not always clear why certain youth are incarcerated while others are sent to less restrictive settings. We must understand how these decisions are

made in order to do good planning. We must also understand what gaps exist in our current service array so we know what interventions to develop that will allow us to rely less on incarceration now and in the future.

### **How many youth will we serve?**

Planning must begin with data-driven census projections, informed by an in depth analysis of risk/needs analysis of committed delinquent youth, including their risk/need profile, family needs, history, etc. Analysis must also consider how an increased array of options for judges and DCF leadership will impact the number of youth the state securely incarcerates. Connecticut statute no longer includes “punish the child” as a mission of the juvenile justice system. The state must implement models to uphold public safety, hold youth accountable and change their behaviors outside of secure facilities unless a youth is a true risk to the public.

### **What do committed youth need?**

An analysis of committed youth must explore their needs, particularly those, such as substance abuse, that are linked to recidivism risk. The DCF plan pledged to “develop an intensive wrap-around teaming process for young women who would otherwise be placed in secure confinement.”<sup>2</sup> This is exactly the right approach to take with committed youth - we must also do the same analysis for special populations, such as girls and LGBTQ youth. How can the state or non-profit providers address the needs of all the youth who enter in a culturally competent way?

### **How do we meet those needs?**

Since it opened, CJTS has been the go-to program for Connecticut's most high-risk and high-need youth. But a variety of interventions in a variety of settings can successfully meet the dual priorities of public safety and positive youth outcomes. We will review available options.

### **Is it fair?**

Most committed delinquent youth are African-American or Hispanic. The judicial commitment decision point must be examined for fairness. Furthermore, DCF's Racial Justice Working Group found that even among committed delinquent youth, African-Americans were more likely to be sent to CJTS than their white peers, who were more likely to be sent to a

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<sup>2</sup> Fernando Muñiz, Plan for the Closure of the Connecticut Juvenile Training School, Department of Children and Families, August, 2017, page 9. (Hereafter “The Plan”)

residential treatment facility or group home. This is also an important data point to examine.

Connecticut literally cannot afford to let implicit bias increase the rate of incarceration and, as a result, the price of its juvenile justice system.

### **What will it cost?**

Incarceration is the most expensive and least effective way to deal with young people who break the law. Extensive research proves as much. Ending the reliance on CJTS, last year a \$54 million expense, should save the state money. Some immediate investment will need to be made to provide alternative interventions and settings. (The new program DCF opened with Connecticut Junior Republic is one example). Additionally, some of the funds currently spent to run CJTS, as it is phased out, must be preserved to provide a robust continuum of services for committed delinquent youth. Relying less on incarceration potentially qualifies Connecticut for more federal reimbursement, which should be vigorously explored. A cost benefit analysis of different options, interventions and scenarios must be completed.

### **Who is responsible?**

DCF has primary responsibility for programming for committed delinquent youth. It is also important to remember that judges commit youth to DCF. As the gatekeepers to committed delinquent status, the Judicial Branch must play an integral role in data analysis and planning. Furthermore, the Department of Corrections has extensive experience with census projections. We should call upon that expertise here. As the legislatively created body to provide juvenile justice system oversight and policy guidance, the Juvenile Justice Policy and Oversight Committee is the natural choice to guide the planning process that must occur between now and July, 2018.

### **What must we do now?**

Youth will still be incarcerated at CJTS between now and the projected closing date of July 1, 2018. We must ensure a safe environment for these youth, without extensive spending at a facility slated for closure. We lay out a number of strategies for improving current conditions and reducing census at CJTS while a new plan for serving committed delinquent youth is developed.

## 1. How many youth will we serve?

### *Census projections*

As will be the case throughout this document, we will consider all youth committed delinquent – not only those who were incarcerated. Any real improvement in our system will require us to look at youth who have been committed delinquent over the last 12 to 18 months to gather the following information:

- Age
- Previous history in the juvenile justice system
- Previous history in the child welfare system
- Previous history in the children's mental health system
- Family situation/needs/safety
- Educational needs
- Offense
- Gender/gender expression
- Race/ethnicity
- Sexual orientation
- Mental health needs
- Risk/needs assessment, if available

The analysis should also correlate each of these factors with the treatment/placement of the youth and youth outcome to determine what is currently working well, what isn't working well, what services are needed by committed youth, as well as how many of the youths' risk-profiles justify the need for secure confinement. We understand that in the absence of better options, the state will default to a more secure setting. We are asking, from a research perspective, when we fully examine Connecticut's committed delinquent population, how many of them need secure confinement because of their risk level to public safety?

The Annie E. Casey Foundation has done extensive research showing the damage done by incarcerating youth who pose no threat to public safety:

While a small number of youthful offenders pose a serious threat to the public and must be confined, incarcerating a broader swath of the juvenile offender population provides no benefit for public safety. It wastes vast sums of taxpayer dollars. And more often than not, it harms the well-being and dampens the future prospects of the troubled and law breaking youth who get locked up. Other



approaches usually produce equal or better results sometimes far better—at a fraction of the cost.<sup>3</sup>

The Plan includes the primary adjudication that sent youth to CJTS. The most common offense was larceny/burglary. Youth were also incarcerated for probation violations, use of a motor vehicle without permission and drug charges. In other words, a significant number of youth seem to have been admitted to CJTS for non-violent offenses. A full analysis of committed delinquent youth will reveal a complete picture that these numbers cannot. Were these charges determined by plea deals? Is the offense profile of youth originally sent to CJTS different from those who are re-admitted to the facility from parole?

This point is particularly important in light of the system's legislative mandate to abandon its "punish the child" mission. If youth are not a threat to public safety, there is no reason that they should be incarcerated in order to receive services.

DCF's plan notes that the recent population of CJTS has averaged approximately 48 and projects an ongoing need for 40 to 50 beds, adding that it could downsize should the need decrease.<sup>4</sup> There is no analysis or calculation to show how that number was determined, and it seems to imply that the status quo is the best the state can achieve. To guide a decision of such import to public safety, youth outcomes and the state budget, the state must do a rigorous analysis of need now and plan an appropriate service array rather than create something that we acknowledge could need downsizing.

To that end, we believe DCF's plan contains worthy goals:<sup>5</sup>

1. Redefine eligibility for secure placement;
2. Supporting the use of graduated responses;
3. Preserving non-residential community-based services and supports;<sup>6</sup>
4. Improving community supervision of youth;
5. Right-sizing, redesigning and replacing CJTS with a smaller secure facility.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Annie E. Casey Foundation. No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration. 2011, page 3.

<sup>4</sup> The Plan, page 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> The Plan, page 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Increasing and improving* these services will decrease the need for secure care.

<sup>7</sup> The goal should be not so much to "replace CJTS" as to build an effective system for committed youth that includes some secure options. Our planning should start with youth and their needs, rather than attempt to create a better version of a building.

Work toward the first four of these goals will combine to reduce the current population at CJTS and reduce the number of secure beds needed in the future.

Connecticut has experience and expertise in projecting facility census through the Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division (CJPPD) within the Office of Policy and Management. The state should examine CJPPD's methodology to see if it could be applied to the juvenile justice population.

### *Reducing readmission*

The plan outlines good work DCF has done in the past year to successfully reduce the number of youth at CJTS. "Even given these policy changes and trends, however, the census of CJTS has recently averaged approximately 48 youth because of readmissions from the community," The Plan states.<sup>8</sup> This suggests that readmissions should be examined closely.

Talking with DCF and reviewing their documents, we found instances of youth who were readmitted because they did not feel safe in their homes or communities, or did not have homes.<sup>9</sup> *No child should be incarcerated to protect his physical safety or to get him services. There must be alternatives to provide help and safety to these youth without re-incarcerating them.* Parole officers must have access to a variety of ways to supervise, support and hold youth accountable in their communities without reverting to re-admission.

The Department of Corrections is piloting a project to help young adult parolees at high risk of re-incarceration. The Judicial Branch's Court Support Services Division (CSSD) is piloting an intensive supervision program for youth at high-risk of being committed delinquent. Could either of these be a model for use by DCF?

Fernando Muñiz, author of The Plan, said on August 22, 2016, that there is a need for programming outside CJTS that has a higher level of security than traditional residential placement. On that same date, CJTS Superintendent William Rosenbeck described the lack of a staff secure

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<sup>8</sup> The Plan, page 4.

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix A – See document that lists one youth "requested return to CJTS as he had no place to live," and another for "safety concerns (for him) after best friend fatally shot in the head." Neither of those youth had pending charges related to their admission.

program for youth who are struggling after release from CJTS as a “large gap” in the system. He wanted a tighter wrap-around option and a way to “tune up” youth, discharged from CJTS to the community, when they backslide. Muñiz further proposed reviewing de-identified cases and meeting with providers to get a sense of their capacity. This would be enormously beneficial – and indeed most of the experts we spoke with considered such a process essential.

The comments of Muñiz and Rosenbeck underline DCF's understanding of the need to create better supports when youth leave secure care for the community – and, critically, better evaluation of what supports are needed. This is essential for preventing re-admission and for the safety of youth and the community. And, as presented earlier, this fuller array not only reduces the need for re-admission, but may reduce overall admissions to secure care in the first place. DCF must receive the data analysis and funding support to make this (and the rest of the things needed to achieve the Governor's mandate) possible.

Connecticut may be able to learn from the experience of other states. In an effort to reduce re-admissions to its juvenile prison, Delaware is constructing a system that will make supports available to discharged youth and their families, 24/7, for a full year. Youth-family advisors are being contracted to promote engagement in community-based activities and organizations, address educational, vocational and employment needs, and help with broader family concerns.<sup>10</sup>

## **2. What do these youth need?**

### *Assessments*

Decisions about services and placement must include consideration of validated risk and needs assessments. Without such an objective framework, it is impossible to appropriately match youth to interventions most likely to address their needs, reduce recidivism and protect public safety.

In 2013, consultants from Georgetown University found that DCF's risk and needs assessment tool, the Correctional Offender Management Profiling and Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) was unreliable and not used

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<sup>10</sup> State of Delaware, Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, Request for Proposals #CYF14-04. 2014.

consistently.<sup>11</sup> A 2015 follow-up by a Georgetown subcontractor found that sufficient assessment was still not taking place:

The correlation of service referral with identified needs was not possible. As DCF develops its new risk and needs assessment practices, it will be possible to analyze the match of criminogenic needs within a community to the service array. When combined with dosage standards, it will be possible to forecast the needed capacity of programs.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, the team found that in the absence of objective data, incarceration became the preferred option:

In the focus group of parole managers and supervisors, it was evident that there is a need for some method of comparative evaluation of interventions. They contended that the CJTS was the best treatment program available in Connecticut, but could not articulate any evidence or study to support their contention. This assumption about the quality of the CJTS program may result in a preference for placement at the CJTS rather than in other residential establishments (especially those that are less restrictive), or for reliance on confinement-based rather than community-based programming.<sup>13</sup>

The Plan talks about adoption of the Youth Level of Service Case Management Inventory<sup>14</sup>, as recommended by the Georgetown consultants. This is an extremely positive step.

We have several critical questions on this matter:

- Is DCF currently using any standardized risk/needs assessment?
- If not, how are decisions on treatment and placement made?
- At what decision points are assessments used and with what fidelity?
- How do DCF's assessments coordinate with those used by CSSD?
- Do judges use any standardized tool in deciding whether to commit a youth to DCF?

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<sup>11</sup>*The Georgetown Final Report for The State of Connecticut*, Department of Children and Families, June 2013, Marion R. Kelly, MSQ Comprehensive Strategy Group with Jason C. Howell, PH.S. Comprehensive Strategy Group, and Kristen Johnson, PH.D. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, page 8. (Hereafter Georgetown.)

<sup>12</sup> M. Kelly. Final Report Comprehensive Service Array Mapping Prepared for DCF, Comprehensive Strategy Group, August 31, 2015, page 6.

<sup>13</sup> Georgetown, page 8.

<sup>14</sup> The Plan, page 8.

## *Structured decision-making*

The natural partner of validated risk/needs assessments is structured decision-making - objective tools and processes that guide placement/matching to services. Nationally, structured decision-making is widely used in child protective services as well as juvenile justice to reduce unnecessary deep-end involvement and to limit the impact of implicit bias in critical decisions.

Through the use of disposition matrices, judicial and probation officers are able to make more informed decisions that enhance practices and policies for safer communities and more successful youth. This approach allows for the allocation of resources to where they will be most efficient and effective.<sup>15</sup>

Many models already exist for the adoption of this data-based process in the juvenile justice system, which could be adapted for Connecticut.

Structured decision-making is a key component of the AECF's Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI). Jurisdictions that participated in JDAI lowered their pre-court detention population by 43 percent in a single year.<sup>16</sup>

## *Limits of this report*

Identifying the risk/need profile of youth currently committed delinquent is beyond the scope of this report. Those profiles can only be determined by a thorough analysis of de-identified youth recently in the system. Going forward, the risk/need profile of individual youth must be identified by a standardized and validated tool. However, there are needs that any system must address. The Plan identified the following as services that received strong support at community forums:<sup>17</sup>

- job readiness and vocational training;
- substance abuse treatment and recovery supports;
- educational programs, including credit recovery services;
- transitional housing;
- transportation to facilitate family treatment and access to services;

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<sup>15</sup> National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Disposition Matrices: Purpose. Accessed: <http://www.aecf.org/m/privy/Deep-End-Resource-Guide-7d-Disposition-Matrices-Purpose.pdf>, page 1.

<sup>16</sup> AECF. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative Progress Report. 2014, page 2.

<sup>17</sup> The Plan, pages 6-7.

- individualized plans for youth with complex needs;
- programs with longer length of service to address chronic needs;
- better integration of treatment planning and service delivery processes of the secure facility, regional DCF juvenile justice social workers and service providers.

We were particularly pleased to see individualized plans for youth with complex needs and housing included in this list. We do question the stated commitment to “preserving services”<sup>18</sup> in these areas. Best practices show that access to these services can help youth avoid re-offending. We understand and respect DCF’s budgetary limitations. Therefore, we take up the call for funding to *expand* these services in order to better preserve public safety, reduce recidivism, reduce reliance on secure confinement, and ensure effective and efficient use of state funds.

While a definitive needs list must wait on analysis, it is inevitable that the following needs will be included:

- **Housing.** The inclusion of housing in The Plan is important. Next steps should include determining the types of housing recommended, e.g. shelter, respite, supportive housing, and the role that non-profits might play in providing these.
- **Education.** This should include plans for reconnecting youth to their home districts, recommendations made by the Center for Children’s Advocacy in its 2016 report to the JJPOC, and strategies to implement legislative mandates attached to 2016 juvenile justice reform legislation. These include recommendations related to special, vocational-technical, and higher education.
- **Mental Health Services.** A plan for delinquent youth must ensure continuity of clinical services across placements. Justice-involved youth with behavioral health needs should be fully integrated into the behavioral health system and have access to all the services and supports that they would receive if not involved in the juvenile justice system. Available services should certainly include cognitive behavioral therapy. Finally, the plan for delinquent youth must be coordinated with the implementation of the 2014 Connecticut Behavioral Health Plan for Children. DCF’s recommendation to “amend contracts to allow services to remain in place after the end of delinquency commitment”<sup>19</sup> is a good one. *As is true throughout the continuum of care for youth committed delinquent, funding*

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<sup>18</sup> The Plan, page 6.

<sup>19</sup> The Plan, page 9.

*must be in place. The Plan speaks of using existing appropriations to provide mental health services. We cannot know if existing appropriations will be adequate without a needs analysis.*

- Substance Use/Abuse. A plan must address providing an array of treatment for substance using and abusing youth. Transition to continuing care post-commitment must be standardized and guaranteed.
- Family. Families are critical to supporting a youth in staying out of trouble. Families must also receive supports in this effort. As youth age, “family” must be redefined to mean those closest to and most supportive of their success. The Plan calls for transportation to make family treatment easier for youth in secure placement. This is a wise and necessary change. It should be extended to all youth in out-of-home care and support visitation as well as treatment
- Trauma. It is commonly accepted that most youth in the juvenile justice system have a history of exposure to trauma and many have been victims of crime. Our system must be fully trauma-informed at all levels and throughout all interventions.
- Physical health
- Economic stability
- Positive relationships

Finally, all needs must be met with culturally competent services. This competency should include race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression.

### **3. How do we meet these needs?**

There will always be youth who present with unique needs. A rigid system will fail to serve these youth well, increasing their risk of incarceration. DCF has taken a step within its child welfare system to serve all children well through Unique Service Expenditure (USE) plans and mentions utilizing these funds for committed delinquent youth as well.<sup>20</sup> We fully support this idea. USE allows for flexible funding to be tailored to the needs of a child. USE ensures that the state will not create entire programs to serve unusual needs, which is fiscally irresponsible, or put youth into existing programs that are ill-equipped to serve them, undermining public safety. The current process requires approval and periodic review to prove that the service is providing true benefits to the child.

Additionally, as part of implementation of the 2014 Connecticut Behavioral Health Plan for Children, DCF has launched a wrap-around

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<sup>20</sup> The plan, page 9.

service model for high-need youth in the behavioral health system. Are there outcomes demonstrating this program's effectiveness? If the model is working, could it be extended to youth in the juvenile justice system?

#### *Individualized wrap-around services*

The Plan calls for such services for girls at risk of incarceration. The same philosophy should be extended to boys as a matter of fairness and because boys now comprise the entire population at CJTS. We cannot reduce the census without serving boys better. We must also ensure that our system recognizes, supports and creates individualized interventions for youth that respect their gender identity and sexual orientation.

#### *Community-based services*

The Plan also laudably discusses intensive community-based services. Elsewhere, provision of individualized wrap-around services has decreased juvenile incarceration, created better outcomes for youth and for public safety, and lowered costs. For example, Youth Advocates Programs (YAP) provides wrap-around services to high-risk, high-need youth in communities across the country. They report extremely high success rates:

A series of briefs by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation Center noted that of 3,523 high-risk youth living at home and supported by an intensive community-based program, 86% remained arrest free while in the program and 93% remained living at home at the end of services. In a separate brief, the Research and Evaluation Center looked at 1,851 YAP youth who were in the juvenile justice system for misdemeanors, status offenses and felonies. The use of secure confinement for youth decreased, regardless of the severity of the offense. Six to twelve months after discharge from YAP, 95% were living at home and in their communities.<sup>21</sup>

Roca, a Massachusetts-based program for high-risk adolescents and young men cited by DCF in their Plan,<sup>22</sup> also demonstrates promising results. In 2015, the program served 659 high-risk males. Of those, 98 percent had no new incarcerations, 93 percent had no new arrests, 88 percent had no new technical violations, and 92 percent retained employment for at least 90 days. "Roca's services are designed to work with young people who are not prepared to participate in traditional

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<sup>21</sup> Shaena M. Fazal, *Safely Home*. Youth Advocate Programs, 2014, page V.

<sup>22</sup> The Plan, page 8.



programming. All program components address issues of relapse, using failure as a tool to help young people learn. “<sup>23</sup>

Similar data are not available from CJTS to allow for comparison, though these figures are tremendous improvements on recidivism data from juvenile incarceration nationwide.

Recently, under the auspices of the JJPOC, Connecticut submitted a grant to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. DCF and the Judicial Branch collaborated on the grant with the State Department of Education, Office of Policy and Management and various advocates. It is centered upon a commitment and plan to provide individualized, family-focused care to youth in the juvenile justice system and includes many of the principles programs like Roca and YAP espouse. The planning, action plan and timeline from that application should be apparent in Connecticut’s plan for its treatment of committed delinquent youth.

#### *Creating a full continuum of quality services*

This report will repeat one central strategy again and again: Take an in-depth look at the youth already committed delinquent and find out what they need. That is step one. Then it should look to create a structured decision-making tool guided by the profile of youth the analysis provides. This work will allow the state to:

- Identify gaps the structured decision-making matrix shows. (What gears are missing on our bike?)
- Determine what evidence-based ways there are to fill those gaps.
- Collaborate with the non-profit community to determine its capacity to provide programming, including taking some responsibility for staff and hardware secure options. The Plan makes mention of collaboration with non-profit providers, an extremely positive action step.<sup>24</sup>
- Determine how many youth would still need secure beds if service gaps were filled.
- Decide the best option for locating the secure beds the system still needs.
- Embed a transparent process of continuous quality improvement to ensure that all programs in the continuum follow best practice, are therapeutic and serve youth safely, effectively and efficiently.

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<sup>23</sup> [www.rocainc.org](http://www.rocainc.org)

<sup>24</sup> The Plan, page 11.

#### 4. Is it fair?

##### *Race/ethnicity*

Youth of color enter the juvenile justice system at higher rates than whites and are more likely to suffer its most severe consequences, including, as detailed earlier, placement at CJTS. Furthermore, the state's own studies show that this holds true even when white and minority youth have largely similar circumstances.<sup>25</sup>

As a matter of justice, any analysis of the system must look for intentional ways to end these disparities. As a matter of practicality, we cannot develop reasonable projections of how many secure beds the state needs until we understand and address the ways race and ethnicity factor into judicial decisions to commit a youth delinquent and DCF decisions around placement at the training school versus less secure environments.

The state uses clear criteria for pre-trial confinement, as defined by statute. Youth cannot be sent to detention unless they are a flight or public safety risk or unless they are being held for another jurisdiction. The same criteria could be applied to post-adjudication placement. This could be a matter of policy – or a subject of additional legislation. This is something for the JJPOC to consider.

Critical questions to examine include:

- How are Judicial decisions to commit currently made? Are they consistent across judicial districts? Are they driven by risk/need assessments or more discretionary methods?
- How are placement decisions currently made once youth are committed delinquent to DCF? Are they consistent across DCF regions? Are they driven by risk/need assessments or more discretionary methods?
- Is disproportionality in the child welfare system leading to disproportionality in the juvenile justice system? If so, how can the state increase fairness in the child welfare side to decrease this?
- Are decisions by non-profit providers contributing to the over-placement of youth of color at CJTS?

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<sup>25</sup> Dorinda M. Richetelli, et al. A Second Reassessment of Disproportionate Minority Contact in Connecticut's Juvenile Justice System. State of Connecticut, OPM, May 15, 2009.

DCF consultant Robert Kinscherff reported that:

... some DCF and external collaterals expressed concerns that although 'no reject' provisions accompany DCF contracting, in practice community-based providers are reportedly reluctant to engage youth with juvenile justice involvement and African-American males are particularly difficult to get accepted by providers. This, in turn, has reportedly delayed discharge of some youth from CJTS or Pueblo and/or contributed to their return when they failed to successfully re-enter their communities.<sup>26</sup>

African-American and Latino males are half as likely to receive mental health services as non-Hispanic whites, though research suggests that all youth experience behavioral and mental health issues at similar rates.<sup>27</sup>

- How can we improve access to mental health services for youth of color?
- Is behavior rooted in trauma or mental illness more likely to be seen as delinquency when the youth involved is African-American or Latino?

Again, any plan must lay out deliberate methodology to determine the answers to these questions and intentionally eliminate disparities in treatment resulting from the color of an individual's skin.

### *Girls*

Girls are a rapidly growing proportion of the juvenile justice system nationally and comprise about 30 percent of the system in Connecticut. DCF no longer uses the Pueblo Unit of CJTS for committed delinquent girls – and we strongly agree with DCF's decision. However, it is important for this plan to purposefully address the needs of committed delinquent girls as well as boys.

- What is our service array for girls in the juvenile justice system?

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<sup>26</sup> Robert Kinscherff, Strategic Review of CJTS/Pueblo Girls Program Policies and Practices, July 1, 2015, pages 31-32.

<sup>27</sup> M.A. Lindsey, What are depressed African-American adolescent males saying about mental health services and providers? *Social work with African-American males: Health, mental health, and social policy.*, W.E. Johnson, Jr., Editor. 2010, Oxford University Press: New York, NY US. p. 161-178.

The Plan speaks of individualized wrap-around services for girls at risk of incarceration. This is an excellent strategy, and we would like to see more details about how the state proposes to serve girls.

### *LGBTQ youth*

No data are available on the number of LGBTQ youth in our child welfare or juvenile justice systems. Nationally, we know that these young people are over-represented in both systems and are especially vulnerable to abuse in juvenile prisons. Various studies estimate that 5 to 7 percent of the youth population is LGBTQ, while 13 to 15 percent of the juvenile justice population is LGBTQ.<sup>28</sup> The AECF estimates that for girls the number jumps to 40 percent.<sup>29</sup> In the community, these youth are more likely to experience verbal, physical and sexual abuse than their peers. An Institute of Medicine and National Research Council report found LGBT boys and girls are more vulnerable to sex trafficking.<sup>30</sup> There are no studies that break out transgender youth, who are particularly unlikely to be served in a culturally competent way and to experience abuse.

If Connecticut follows national norms, and a significant percentage of the youth in our juvenile justice system – particularly in the deepest end of the system – are LGBTQ, any plan must answer fundamental questions:

- How do we support family acceptance to protect against out-of-home placements?
- How do we protect LGBTQ youth against school, community and family violence?
- Is our juvenile justice programming supporting the needs of this population?
- Are out-of-home placements safe for LGBTQ youth? Abuse in placements, from peers or staff, can lead to youth going AWOL. This increases LGBTQ youth's already high risk for trafficking.

### *Crossover youth*

Youth who enter the child welfare system are at high risk of involvement in the juvenile justice system. Any plan must include strategies for preventing

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<sup>28</sup> OJJDP. LGBT Youths In The Juvenile Justice System. Accessed: <http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/LGBTQYouthsInTheJuvenileJusticeSystem.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Annie E. Casey Foundation. Lesbian, Gay and Transgender Youth in the Juvenile Justice System. September 28, 2015.

<sup>30</sup> IOM (Institute of Medicine) and NRC (National Research Council). 2013. *Confronting Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Sex Trafficking of Minors in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press

child protective services clients from getting caught up in delinquency. Some emerging research is identifying best practices to prevent crossover.<sup>31</sup> Connecticut must identify these practices and implement them here. It must also look to best practices for dually involved youth.

A Connecticut multi-disciplinary team participated in Georgetown University's Crossover Youth Fellowship at the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform. The group initially focused on data collection. Has the group collected information that would be relevant to planning services for committed delinquent youth? We believe there was a pilot program to address the needs of dually-committed youth. Are there lessons learned that are relevant to this plan? Could members contribute their expertise to make sure that service design both prevents entry of crossover youth and provides appropriate support for youth who are dually involved?

## **5. What will it cost?**

Providing a youth with safe and effective treatment that will enhance public safety and lead to the youth's success is the state's obligation – particularly when the state removes young people from their families. The primary goal of this report is to lay out a process that will serve youth better.

Happily, reducing incarceration is better for public safety, youth outcomes *and* taxpayers' dollars. That has been the experience in other jurisdictions and here for Connecticut taxpayers. Spending on the Connecticut juvenile justice system in 2011-2012 was less than what was spent in 2001-2002 (adjusting for inflation).<sup>32</sup> Connecticut drastically reduced its use of incarceration and increased its community-based services during that same time period.

Following staff layoffs, DCF puts the cost to run CJTS at approximately \$30 million annually.<sup>33</sup> In 2015, 176 youth were admitted to the facility. At that usage level, the per-child cost is more than \$170,000 per child, per year. Some youth could be successfully served in the community with 24-hour, one-on-one care or at a less restrictive facility at lower cost than the correctional model of CJTS.

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<sup>31</sup> Citizens for Juvenile Justice. *Missed Opportunities: Preventing Youth in the Child Welfare System from Entering the Juvenile Justice System*. September 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Richard Mendel. *Juvenile Justice Reform in Connecticut: How Collaboration and Commitment Have Improved Public Safety and Outcomes for Youth*. Justice Policy Institute. 2013, page 3.

<sup>33</sup> Comment from DCF staff at JJPOC Incarceration Working Group meeting August 22, 2016.

Experience shows that a system of individualized services would drastically reduce these costs. According to YAP, the costs of such systems are generally only a quarter to a third of the price of incarceration:

Effective community-based programs can serve three to four kids in the community for the same price as locking one up. In fact, if communities served 20 youth in the community over 6 months, instead of through out-of-home placement, they could save more than half a million dollars.<sup>34</sup>

The costs of incarceration go beyond the running of a facility, as a Justice Policy Institute (JPI) report demonstrates. JPI calculated the cost of recidivism, lost future earnings of confined youth, lost future tax revenue, additional Medicaid/Medicare spending and costs of sexual assault of confined youth.<sup>35</sup> These totaled \$7.9 to \$21.57 billion nationally in 2011 dollars.

By relying heavily on incarceration for committed delinquent youth, we eliminate the possibility for federal reimbursement under Title IV of the Social Security Act, which excludes payments when youth are incarcerated. Title IV-E Administrative Claiming provides quarterly reimbursement for preventative measures taken to keep “at risk” youth in their home, such as:

- Out-of home placements (e.g. foster beds, shelter beds, and residential treatment)
- Preparation for placement
- Development of case plans
- Case reviews
- Home visits
- School visits
- Court related activity

Consulting firms exist to help states claim these benefits. For example, Multnomah County, OR began a Title IV claiming program and is expecting to receive an additional \$800,000 annually for juvenile justice expenses as a result.<sup>36</sup> Connecticut’s population is about 4.5 times that of Multnomah County.

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<sup>34</sup> Fazal, page IV.

<sup>35</sup> Justice Policy Institute. Sticker Shock: Calculating the full price for youth incarceration. December, 2014.

<sup>36</sup> Christina McMahan and Kimberly King. Implementing Title IV-E Claiming Program in Juvenile Justice: The Multnomah County Experience. Powerpoint presentation. 2015

As plans in Connecticut move forward, it will be important to determine cost-benefit analysis of various options and ideas to determine what is best for public safety, what is best for youth and what is best for the budget. The Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy has begun this process through Results First analysis of some programs.<sup>37</sup> Additional cost-benefit analysis should be commissioned and combined with results based accountability analysis of programming. With those answers in hand, a fully informed, transparent decision-making process can follow.

The JJPOC is ideally formed to look into cross-branch opportunities for federal reimbursement and cost-benefit analysis. It is also a more neutral third party to look at issues around appropriations that constrain the Judicial Branch and DCF.

Connecticut can begin piloting alternatives to incarceration now to gather knowledge, provide better service to youth, and save money. Adoption of better practices need not wait for CJTS's closing. To reiterate a point made earlier, funding must be allocated to ensure the steps needed to allow for the phasing out and closing of CJTS to happen in an expedited fashion. The savings from the closure will make up for funding spent to create the alternative array of interventions.

## **6. Who is responsible?**

### *Role of JJPOC*

The JJPOC should assume responsibility for the systemic examination and transformation of our policies and practices surrounding committed delinquent youth. JJPOC's lead would recognize that responsibility for youth committed delinquent does not lie with DCF alone. Judges make the decision to commit youth delinquent. Also, as a legislatively-appointed body, the JJPOC can explore and advocate for appropriations needed to fulfill the Governor's mandate in ways an executive branch agency cannot. Furthermore, JJPOC lead emphasizes increases transparency, through its public meeting format.

### *Role of judicial branch*

Developing a comprehensive and fair system for youth committed delinquent is not solely the responsibility of DCF. The vast majority of these

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<sup>37</sup> June 18, 2015 IMRP presentation at JJPOC meeting  
[https://www.cga.ct.gov/app/tfs%5C20141215\\_Juvenile%20Justice%20Policy%20and%20Oversight%20Committee%5C20150618/IMRP%20Pew%20PowerPoint%20Presentation.pdf](https://www.cga.ct.gov/app/tfs%5C20141215_Juvenile%20Justice%20Policy%20and%20Oversight%20Committee%5C20150618/IMRP%20Pew%20PowerPoint%20Presentation.pdf)

youth have gone through programs administered by the Judicial Branch's Court Support Services Division (CSSD). All of them are committed delinquent by juvenile court judges. Therefore, it is essential that the Judicial Branch be integral to the planning process and that data relating to the judicial decision-point be fully examined. Again, the question of standardized, validated assessments and structured decision-making tools must be explored. How do judges decide who should and should not be committed? We know that commitment rates vary by region, suggesting that standards are not uniform. Connecticut's children must never be subjugated to justice by geography.

Could additional investments in the Judicial Branch and CSSD programs prevent commitments? Would judges be less apt to commit with even more alternatives available? Recent extensive cuts to CSSD's service array have limited these options, threatening to increase rather than decrease judicial commitment rates. For all these reasons, the Judicial Branch must be fully engaged in the data analysis and planning process.

## **7. What must we do now?**

Governor Malloy's commitment to close CJTS by July, 2018 is in the best interest of public safety, taxpayers and youth. A thorough analysis of the needs posed by the committed delinquent population, as outlined in this report, will point out a way to achieve this while maximizing benefits.

We must also take immediate steps to ensure the safety of youth currently in CJTS and to provide the best rehabilitative services possible while we work to develop an array of services, including secure confinement, more in line with current best practices. As the plan notes:

CJTS has been a source of public concern almost since the day the facility opened in 2001. The facility was built based on a secure facility in Ohio and its construction played a major part in the scandal that led to the resignation of Governor John Rowland. From the beginning, advocates expressed concerns with the level of security, the programming and the number of restraints at the facility. More recently, there has been an increase in staff injuries and worker's compensation claims.<sup>38</sup>

What steps can we take for youth in CJTS now and in the period while we are developing an alternative service array?

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<sup>38</sup> The Plan, page 2.



We recommend an immediate case review for all youth at CJTS. This will:

- Reveal some youth who can immediately be served in less restrictive settings
- Point out service gaps that prevent youth who pose no threat to the community from leaving the facility

### *Staffing*

The Plan lists changing the Youth Service Officer job description<sup>39</sup> to promote more involvement in treatment planning.<sup>40</sup> This is a positive step. We would like to see more specifics about the new job description. What training and supports can be provided to staff to help them learn and integrate new approaches to the youth in their care? If some members of the staff at CJTS do not buy-in to the necessary cultural changes, how can the state respond?

### *Restraints*

The use of restraints poses a risk to youth and staff alike. The Office of the Child Advocate (OCA) in 2015 and 2016 found high rates of restraints at CJTS, as well as other safety and programming concerns. There are several strategies that can be employed to decrease restraints at low or no cost.

Restraints may be a response to youth behaviors that are themselves responses to trauma. Kinscherff's report notes the difficulty of sustaining trauma-informed care in juvenile correctional facilities and suggests external review, even providing a list of recommended experts to conduct such reviews.<sup>41</sup>

DCF has already had success instituting trauma-informed practices in the child welfare system through the Connecticut Collaborative on Effective Practices for Trauma (CONCEPT).<sup>42</sup> CONCEPT is a four-part initiative that includes: workforce development, trauma screening, dissemination of evidence-based treatments and trauma informed policy. CONCEPT could be expanded to the juvenile justice system.

A comprehensive list of strategies to reduce restraints can be found in the

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<sup>39</sup> The Plan, page 10.

<sup>40</sup> We are also pleased to see The Plan include recognition that treatment planning needs to be done across the system to ensure continuity of care.

<sup>41</sup> Kinscherff, page 34.

<sup>42</sup> For more on CONCEPT, see <http://www.chdi.org/index.php/publications/issue-briefs/issue-brief-49>.

original OCA report.<sup>43</sup> These include:

- Adhering to national standards, such as those promulgated by the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative [which includes guidelines on the use of restraints].
- Plan to implement the recommendations made in the Georgetown and Kinscherff reports.
- Increase training for frontline staff to support a trauma-responsive facility, including de-escalation strategies.
- Create a clear protocol for transfer of youth with acute mental health needs.
- Require expert, multidisciplinary review of individual treatment plans for youth who have been repeatedly restrained or secluded.

### *Clinical care*

Restraint and seclusion are both responses to crises – crises that in some cases can be averted by clinical staff. CJTS currently has 10 clinical staff for a census of about 48 youth.<sup>44</sup>

- What are the responsibilities of these staff?
- What does coverage look like over a 24-hour period?
- Is their role primarily crisis management or prevention?
- Do they set measurable individualized goals and objectives for youth?

### *Adopting Best Practices*

The Plan calls for following the Annie E. Casey Foundation's (AECF) framework of principles for youth in secure placement. This is a good step, but we would ask DCF to clarify statements in the plan that seem to suggest it may follow only some of the principles.

The Plan states:

Many of these principles have been and/or will be incorporated into the program at CJTS and any future facility that replaces CJTS. Some items, like not having locks on the bedroom doors, will be evaluated based on the security level at any future facilities and the individual needs of the youth.<sup>45</sup>

The AECF principles specifically address conditions for the highest-risk

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<sup>43</sup> Office of the Child Advocate. Investigative Facility Report: Connecticut Juvenile Training School and Pueblo Unit. July 22, 2015, page 21-23.

<sup>44</sup> DCF. CJTS Current Staff by department: 8/23/2016

<sup>45</sup> The Plan, page 7.

youth who are in secure facilities. Therefore, every principle should be applicable to securely confined youth in Connecticut.

### *Reducing census*

Leading up to closure, the state may undertake many of the strategies laid out in this report to reduce admissions and readmissions to CJTS. Keeping more youth out of a locked facility should allow for more individualized care and treatment for those who remain.

Notably, The Plan discusses using teaming to prevent readmission of youth on parole. This is a laudable practice and should be extended to cover youth at all points of contact with the system.

Finally, as a more robust selection of community-based services becomes available, admission to CJTS should decline.

## **8. Conclusion**

Closing CJTS will benefit public safety, taxpayers, and youth. We must move swiftly and resolutely to follow the Governor's mandate to shut down an outdated, discredited approach to juvenile justice and public safety.

The purpose of this document is not to lay out all the answers as Connecticut searches for better ways to serve youth committed delinquent. It is to make sure we are asking the right questions. As of today, no one can say how many secure beds our juvenile justice system needs. More broadly, there is no comprehensive picture of the needs of the youth whose complex and often traumatic lives have landed them in the deep end of our system. Connecticut needs that information.

Once we have that fundamental information, however, there are many resources that already exist to point us in the right direction – including work that consultants have already done for DCF. Their work and the work of juvenile justice experts nationally tell us that the way forward should focus on:

- A validated assessment of the strengths, needs and risks that each child brings to the system
- A structured decision-making matrix to guide our creation of a service array and placement decisions within that array
- Individualized plans that deliver the appropriate services to each child – rather than seeking to cobble together less than ideal programming based on slots

- A measurable commitment to treat all youth fairly
- A preference for community-based services
- A shift of resources from CJTS to the community
- A restriction of locked facilities for only youth who pose a threat to public safety

As discussed in this document, there are steps Connecticut can take immediately to begin reducing the use of incarceration and developing additional intervention options. The work is complex, but certainly achievable in the Governor's timeframe. A transformation of our approach to committed delinquent youth will once again bring Connecticut to the forefront of juvenile justice leadership.

### **Acknowledgements**

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 Connecticut Junior Republic  
 Connecticut Legal Services  
 Connecticut Voices for Children

Juvenile Justice Liaison, Connecticut Youth Services Association  
FAVOR  
LifeBridge Community Services  
NAMI Connecticut  
Office of the Chief Public Defender  
Office of the Child Advocate  
RYASAP  
The Tow Foundation  
True Colors  
The Village for Families and Children

## CJTS Congregate Care and Parole Re-admissions, Jan. 2016 - Aug. 2016

Reg. 1	17	39%	17% dually committed
Reg. 2	6	13%	
Reg. 3	2	4%	average age = 17.1 years
Reg. 4	9	20%	
Reg. 5	9	20%	
Reg. 6	3	6%	

Race	Region	Adm Categories	Age at Admission	Reason for Admission	Pending Charges (if any) related to admission
A	1	CC	17.6	AWOL from program; smoking 10 blunts/day; apprehended in stolen car	"may face" charges re: stolen car and stolen credit card
O	1	P	18.6	AWOL for two weeks, not attending school, using heroin daily; panhandling	
A	1	P	16.5	Missing school, arguing w/ grandmother, suspended from school	
A	1	CC	17.7	recent arrest	Larceny 2nd & Conspiracy
H	1	P	18.0	recent arrest	Carrying a Pistol Without a Permit, Criminal Possession of a Revolver, Illegal Altercation of a Firearm [sic] and Illegal Transfer of a Pistol
C	1	P	17.2	recent arrest; pattern of staying out all night; smoking marijuana	Driving Without a License, Taking Car without Owner's Permission
A	1	P	17.7	requested to return to CJTS as he had no place to live	
A	1	P	16.3	recent arrest	Burglary
A	1	P	17.2	Struggled at 'foster-care preparation program'; found with knife, suspected of theft	Possession of Marijuana greater than 5 oz; Possession of Marijuana w/ Intent to Sell, Infraction Ticket for Operating Motor Vehicle without a License
A	1	P	17.9	recent arrest	Possession of a Weapon on School Grounds
A	1	P	16.3	safety concerns (for him) after best friend fatally shot in the head	
A	1	P	16.4	remanded to detention on pending charges	Unknown
O	1	CC	16.5	AWOLed from CC; stole a car in Bronx, NY	Breach of Peace in CT; charges also in NY
A	1	CC	15.4	multiple AWOLs from placement, arrests and recommitment	Larceny 1, Interfering with an Officer, Evading a MVA, Driving without a License
C	1	P	19.0	VOP	Breach of Peace
A	1	P	17.2	refusing programming, using and perhaps selling drugs, pulled a knife on bro's girlfriend; AWOL	VOP
C	1	P	17.6	new 18-month commitment	Breach of Peace 2nd, Criminal Mischief 3rd
A	2	P	14.6	VOP (assaulted teacher)	
H	2	P	17.4	fought w/ peer in school	Criminal Mischief 3rd, Threatening 2nd, (2 counts), Conspiracy to Commit Threatening 2nd, Stalking 2nd, Conspiracy to Commit Stalking 2nd, Assault 3rd, Conspiracy to Commit Assault 3rd, Breach of Peace 2nd, and Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Peace 2nd
H	2	P	17.7	pending criminal charges and lack of investment in community based program & school performance	specific pending charges unknown
A	2	P	16.7	recent arrest, then put on electronic monitoring pending approval for CJTS; house shot at several times (w/ mother & sister inside as well)	Criminal Possession of a Firearm, Possession of a Sawed Off Shotgun, Weapon in Motor Vehicle, Larceny 2nd, Interfering with an Officer
A	2	CC	17.1	AWOLing: on the run for 3 months	Grand Larceny (car)
A	2	P	18.2	arrested in a stolen car & attempted to flee	Larcy 3rd (2 counts), Criminal Mischief 3rd, and Interfering w/ Police Office
A	3	CC	17.0	multiple AWOL	Larceny
C	3	P	17.2	outstanding warrant	Warrant for Burglary & Larceny; suspected of stealing firearms with another youth on parole.
A	4	CC	17.9	disrupted from TGH; requested to go to detention	
C	4	CC	17.4	car theft and theft at program	Larceny 3rd, Larceny 1st, Conspiracy

A	4	CC	14.8	AWOL from TGH multiple times	
A/C	4	P	18.1	recent arrest: standoff situation; he jumped from window to escape	Risk of Injury, Breach of Peace, Interfering with an Officer
A	4	P	15.4	pending charges; since return home, not attending school, quit his job, using substances almost daily	Reckless Driving, Larceny 3rd, Engaging Police in a Pursuit, Failure to Display License Plate, Interfering with an Officer
A	4	P	17.2	recent arrest	Threatening 1
A	4	CC	18.3	Left program after 1 week, picked up w/ 15 year old in car, weapon, and pills	Pled guilty to misdemeanor, released to parole and CJTS
O	4	CC	15.9	disruption from CC, multiple arrests, suspect in sexual assault; history of multiple charges and interventions over time	likely Sexual Assault 1 at time of admission (this did not occur)
C	4	P	17.9	Caught in a stolen car and arrested, not attending program, using substances	Unknown
H	5	P	18.6	unexpected release from MYI	sentenced on Assault 3rd
A	5	P	15.5	struggled at 'foster-care preparation program'; found with knife, suspected of theft	unclear
H	5	P	16.2	recommitted as SJO	Possession of a Firearm
H	5	CC	18.3	return from MYI after resolution of charges at CJTS: Assault on a Public Safety Officer	
H	5	P	18.3	violation of parole	pending adult charges related to weapons and narcotics
C	5	P	17.0	AWOL from home; arrest in NY	Possession of Stolen Property 4th, Unauthorized Use of a MV
C	5	P	18.1	arrests in congregate care facility	Misuse of 911 (2 counts), False Reporting of an Incident (2 counts)
C	5	P	17.2	numerous case alerts by parole, substance use, truancy, rarely home	Larceny 3rd
H	5	CC	18.5	return from MYI	
A	6	P	15.7	recent arrest	Larceny 3rd, Criminal "Trover", and Interfering with an Officer
H	6	P	17.3	violated parole, placed on house arrest, gained new charges	Larceny 3rd, Conspiracy to Commit Larceny 3rd, Operating a MV without a License
A	6	P	16.0	not following conditions of parole, staying out at night, using marijuana, threatened to shoot father, alleged to have raced stolen car and crashed it	Trespassing; likely more warrants coming